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THE POWER OF A 9TATE TO W TEhFEI.E II I;TTAT, (N)IL;ERCE
BY THE EXERCTn T !q POLICE AND TAXI!G PG iR.
Introduction.
In considerinjg the question a,.s bo 'ow far a .tate has the
right to iitei'fere with intei'3t3ate corminece it xill be neces-
sary I'st 1,,o detoiiine whothor oir not the po;,Ior in Congress
it oxclusive, by glancini at the causoe -) ich led to the for-
mation of the Artiob.s of Confedoi.tion and by looking brief-
I, at the results of those Articles, w-hich really iere indi-
rectly the cause for thie fornation an4 adoption of the pi'es-
ent Constitution ; and t. en to consider and dscuss the prin-
cipal casog that, have arisen under ,.he comnerce clause of the
Constitution by reaon of sone burden or restraint upon com-
merce by tP, States.
PART I.
Brief Review of the Causes which led the tates
to Sturrender the Powe r to Rqulate Conmerco, uith a
View of gbSowinj that th2 Power in Congress is an Ex-
clusive one.
The first settlers of this country were filled with the
idea of popular sovreigmty, and consequently they planted
themselves in little communitios and had the Council House
and the Toxwn Meeting as tho safeguards of self government.
They conceived that, local goverrment was the only rfe foun-
dation upon ,Ihich they could firmly set their institutions.
And it may be added that the observations of those who have
made our early institutions a special study have led to the
conclusion that, this idea of popular sovreignty and of local
governent spread from the Township to ,be County, and from
the County to the Colony, vi..hout any disastrous or evil re-
n&lts. But the difficulty was in the fact t.hat each State
had a diversity of local interests, and therefore regarded
each other State in a certain degree forein soil ; and when
it had becom:e necessary to form a Confederation, in order for
the St,-tes to secure themselves against the encroachments of
Great Britain, the jealousy that existed between the different
States, and the selfishness with which each State guarded its
own rijbt to govern itself on all subjects, were found to be
an insuperable barrier to tB formation and adoption of any
articles that would bind them together.
The Articles of Confederation were, however, agreed upon
by the States as a form of new government in i4ovember, 1777,
and with such vigilance did each State watch its own rights
that the very power which is an absolute necessity to a peace-
ful and t.rong Government and Union,-- to wit, the power to
control commerce,-- was not surrendered by the respective
States, and it was not long after these Articles went into
effect before the extreme selfishness of the States began to
show itself in the regulation of commerce between them.
The trouble of having this power to regulate commerce in
the States is well swued up by familton in the Federalist
(No. 2), in which he says : 'The interfering and umneighbor-
ly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of
the Union, have in different instances given just cause of
umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that
examples of this nature, if not restrained by a National con-
trol, will be multiplied and extended until they become not
less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious
impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of
the Confederacy.*
The then imperfect Union having become nearly destroyed
by the discord and disgension between the States, experience
soon taught the different States that as long as this pow°er
over commerce remained in the respective States the power in
tle general Gove mnent, was inadequate to 1.', for:i;tion of n
indissoluble Union of indiisoluble Strtes, and so it iias de-
termined by some of t.h,' to renort, to Congress the :;ecessit.y
of call fti:; a convention for the parpose of altering and en-
largingi, the powers of the general Goverrnent, and the report.
of the States having been approved by Congress, a convention
was called to meet, at, Philadelphia in fay, 17637.
As can be anticipated from ,,i'-at, has been said, one of
the principal causes for calling this convention was the ab-
sence i: the general GoverruLent, of the power to regulate cor-
merce between tne tates and .-!it.h foreign nations, and the
convention after a long and tedious session, which was charac-
t:erized by very learned expositions on powers of goverviment.,
a+- last fully met the emergency for which it vias called, by
framing and adopting t.he present Constitution, which has in-
corporated within it, the clause "Congress shall have power to
reogulate comerce with the foreign nations, and among the sev-
e.al States and ith the various Indian tribes.'
From tho fact, thlat thu 3  Lt.es ietained this power over
coimrerce when the Articles of Confedeiration were in existenco,
that those iticles proved t~o be insufficient, to a strong Un-
ion, that when the States possessed this power discord and
dissonsion were prevs.lent aqongr them, that, the absence of this
power in the general Government was one of the main causes
for calling the convention of 1787, and that in the conven-
tion the Rtates surrendered this power to the general Govern-
ment, I think the only logical conclusion is that this power
is exclusive in the general Government and that there is no
concurrent power in the States.
PART I.
Statement and Discussion of the Principal Cases
(Excepting the Taxing Cases) which have arisen under
the Comerce Clause.
The power vested in Congress by virtue of the commerce
clause has been the source of much litigation and the question
of the extent of the power, or as to how far the State can
validly legislate before it encroaches upon the delegated
power to the United States, has been the cause for a great
variance of opinion with the judges of the highest judicial
tribunal of this land.
As the main question discussed by the court, in all the
casei that. .-.ive arisen o.nde.r .-ii, clause is whet:er or not thn
9ate by enac+,ing certain laws has acted witlin its police
.ower or has gono without it. and usurped the powers of +,he
general Governmnent, the firsit question that confronts us in
considering these casei intelligently is, what is the police
power of a state ? The police power has been defined to
be "in a comprehensive sense, that power which embraces the
whole system of internal regulation by ,ihich the 9tate ,sooks
not, on]i to preserve the public order and to provent offenses
against. the Stat u, also to establish for the intrcoursu
of citizens those rules of good marners and -cod neighborhood
which are caloulated to prevent. a conflict of , uh. -nd to
insure to each the uminterrupted enjornext, of his ovn so far
as if, is reasonably consistent with a like enjoy.ent by oth-
ers. ' (Gooley' s . ,imitations', p. 572.) Wen-
ever t,}e Iate acts within this power its legislation will be
valid, and as a general rule the motives of the legislature in
passing a certain act cannot be questioned uTless the act
shows on its face that. it. is a faLrant abuse of the power,
and then t'-o courts will take notice of the fac.,. and declare
stch a statute unconsti+,utional.
The first great case tha-t. arose under t,h-s clause of tbce
Constitution was that of ho v. v (9 Wheaton, 196).
The question for the court, to decide in that case was whether
or not a statute of a State which gave to one of its citizens
the exclusive navigation of all waters within the jurisdiction
of the State, with boats propelled by fire or stemn, was in
any way a regulation of comiherce and therefore not within the
police power of a State, and the court, discussing very elabo-
rately the extent of the police power and also the question as
to what was an interference or regulation of interstate com-
merce, decided that such power exercised by the State was a
regulation of interstate commerce.
The defendant in the case contended that inasmuch as the
privilege only extended within the borders of a State, that
therefore the statute was merely a regulation of internal com-
merce and not a regulation of interstate co.nerce. But Chief
Justice arshall, in writing the opinion, said : 'In regu-
lating commerce with foreign nations the power of Congress
does not stop at jurisdictional lines of the several States.
It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those
lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign na-
tions is that, of the whole United States. Every district has
a right to participate in it. The deep streams whioh pene-
trate our country in every direction pass through the interior
of almost every State in this Union and furnish those means
of exercising this right. If Oongress has the right to rogu-
late com-qeros, that. power must be exercised wherever the sub-
ject exists. If it exists within the State, if a foreign
voyage may coumence or terminate within the State, then the
power of Congress may be exercised within the State.'
While what was said by the distinguished jurist just quo-
ted had reference to comerce with foreign nations, it seems
to me the principle is made still more clear when applied to
commerce among the States ; for no comerce at all could pos-
sibly be carried on among the States unless it was commerce
with the States, as the States are simply divided by an imagi-
nary mathematical line, and it is simply a matter with trans.-
porters from one jurisdiction to the other.
Therefore this power over commerce, which is commercial
intercourse between States and nations, is the power to pre-
scribe rules governing this interstate intercourse, and any
power exercised by the State which grants to its ovn citizens
privileges which citizens of other States, engaged in the same
common commerce, are debarred from is the exercise of an un-
warranted power by the Stato.
9While Jit is an established fact at p-!:Is, po,.-
er to control cormerce which is vested in Congress is -m x-
clusive one, yet there are cases, novertbeles , vwhero the
State m t egislate on subjects wyhich relate to and remotely
affect comerce, and such legis!lf, ion is valid until Super-
seded by National legislation on the same subject. The Legis-
lature of the 9tate of ie-ow Jersey enacted a law which author-
ised a certain corporation to erect a dam across the Black
!.arsh Creek, which is a part of the navigable w'at.ers of the
United States, situated in the State of 1.oew Jersey and which
had floating upon it at the time vessels emolled and licensed
as United Stateq coast.in[g vessels, and the course of these
vessels beinil obstructed by this dam, t.hey ran into and broke
down the dam and were sued for damages by i1>e corporation that
had erected the dam. The owners of the vessels set up as a
defense the unconstitutionality of the statute, claiming that
the law granting the privileg-e to any corporation to erect a
dam was in violation of ,he commerce clause of te Const.itu-
tion bu+. the co't hold that inasmuch as t.Ne value of cer-
tain proport-y would be enhanced by t--- building of the dan and
exclusion of the water, and as t,~ health of the citizens of
hlew Jersey was also probably improved, the law was valid, be-
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cause measures calculated to produco these objects, provided
they do not. cone into conflict, with l vs of the ,general Gov-
ern;. et, ,;oro un:doubtedly vuit,,,in e,bo - vior roservod io the
3tp !s (Wil son v. Uasj- llars. C k * 2 Peters 24T.)
A statut.o of lieov York m,.aking it thc Juity of tho master
of evoy ship arriving :r; ,,, o port. of New York to roport with-
in twenty-four hours after its ti-'ival , in xit., on oath or
affirmation, to ,,> o mayor of the city the names, ages and res-
idences of all passengers on the ship, vis held constitutional
and ,ithin the police pover of a, Sta.,o. The court, in do-
c.iding the case, wrote substantially as follows : That a
tate has completo and mlimited jurisdiction over all persons
and things within its territorial limits where that jurisdic-
tion is not surrendered or restrained by the United States
Contitution ; that by virtue of this the State has not only
the right but it is its bounden duty to advance the safety
and happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide
for their igenera! welfiu'e by any and every act of te legis-
lature whic' it. may doem conducive to t,};ose ends ; t.,-, all
the powers abich relate to merely mnicipal le.-islation, or
what may be more proporly called internal police, are not
surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United
Th ,:h.as, and tha± consequently in -ei ion to those subjocs
,,,to ntuthority of a 3.ate is complete, umqualified and conc]t-
Sive. (Iuiv_ York v. iln, 11 Peters, !OP.)
In renderin(j a decision in the case of Lx, !o ilamhir v.
PH ( i wa'p 51") Judge Story, bp.o upon tho valid-
i+.y of a .+,atu,e which prohibited the sale of distilled spir-
its in any quantity without. a license from t, o selectmen of
the town in which the party selling it resided, said : 'The
controlling, ,nd supreme power over commerce with foreigm na-
tions and among the several Nt,a+.es is Ludoubtedly conferred
upon Congress, yet., in my judg en., it is within the police
power of a St,ate, nevertheless, for the safety or convenience
of trade or for the convenience cf its citizens, to make regu-
lations of comerce for its own ports and harbors and for its
own territory, anid such regulations are valid unless. they come
in conflict with a law of Congress.'
in tho celebrated h:f.ssenger cases, reported in 1 Howard,
283, it, was held th.It, a ':sthate had no power, under the plea of
prote&c.ing ,be health and safety of it.s ovn citizens, to en-
act. a lay; which required tbe master of every ship arriving in
port to pay a certain tax on ever, pasienger thai was landed,
for by so doing the Itate was placing a direct burden upon a
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subject whi.cb was of Ilational importance,-- to wit., the free
passage of subjects of tho rospective ' t:Ates between them.
It wa, in thu opinion wn'itten in these cases by Wr. Jus-
tice (Irtis that the local and Iational doctrine,-- t-o wit,
that, all subjects which -ie of a local character and only ro-
'notely respect coinerce are proper subjects of legislation for
the State, such legislation being valid until Congress legis-
lates upon the same subject, but all subjects which are of a
National character and require a uniform legislation can only
be legislated upon by Congress,-- was first, clearly laid down
as an established and controlling principle of the court in
all oases where the subject of proper legislation of the State
was in issue ; although it can be seen from reading the pri-
or decisions of the court that this principle had always been
recognised by it but not plainly laid down. This doctrine
since it., was clearly announced by the court has always been
in all cases where the regulation of interstate cormnerce was
in issue, except in the taxing cases, the principal doctrine
applied by the court in determining t-he question whether a
St,ate has acted within or without its police power. I think
it can be stated with propriety that ever since this dootrine
was first laid down by M,.Ir. Justice Curtis it has been to the
Supreme Court of Vre United tates what fhe north star has
been to th explorer,-- forever a omide, whether the court was
being tossed from conclusion to conclusion by the waves of
eloquence which have flown from t.he lips of distinuished ju-
rists arglirng iA the forum or whether the couxt in search of
a new and broader principle to apply was being led on into
the unknown and uncertain paths of discovery by the medita-
tions and discussions in the secret chambers of the court.
it has been held to be perfectly valid for a State to
require every ship master coming into port. with a ship to
receive pilots, and if they do not to subject them to a cer-
tain penalty ; the grounds upon which the decision is based
being t.hat although the statute was clearly a regulation of
com:ierce, yet as Congress had not enacted any law on the sub-
ject, and as the safety of the citizens of the State was in-
volved, the legislation of t.he Itate would be perfoctly valid
until superseded by Congressional legislation.
In Giir= v. Philadelphia (3 Wallace, 713), the validity
of a statute of a State was upheld which providod for the e-
rect+ion of a bridge over the Schuylkill River at Chestnut
Street, Philadelphia. This river is a part, of tbhe navigable
waters of the United States and upon it coast vessels engaged
in commerce between the States and licensed and eroiled as
coa-ting veelR. A person by tVu nr,e of Gilman owning a
wharf on fle, river, just above the place where the bridgre was
to be constructed, which would be greatly damaged by the con-
struction of it., contended that the statute passed by the
State authroising the erection of tbh bridge was unconstitu-
tional, as it, vitally interfered with co.nerce of the state.
The courn, in deciding the case came to the conclusion that al-
though t'he s +atte mi. ht, be a slight rejulation of com.erce,
yet, the buildir ni of a bridge was a local matter which had to
do simply with the interest of the State itself and thereforo
i+, was in +,he police power of a State to enact such laws.
Whenever a State passes a law which discriminates between
the rigihts of its own citizens and those of anothei' State it
clearly, attempts to regul,!ate commerce, and consequently a
statute vilich prohibits any person from selling certain wares
in the State which are not the growth, product or manufacture
of the State, without, a license, is invalid. (Wilto v. Mi-
curt, 91 L. ;. 265.)
Any Stlte invades the power of Congress when it seeks to
impose upon t.he master of every ship that brings passengers
into its ports the burden of giving a bond in a penalty of a
certain amount. for every passenger landed, or allows him to
conmiiutte within twenty-four hours afl-,er arrival by paying a
certain sum for each passenger, as the design of such a stat-
u+e passed by a State is simply to place a tax upon the pas-
sengers, and as transportation of passengers is an act, of
coimnerce, such a restriction upon it is invalid. (lHenderson
v. Mayo, 92, U. S. 27#-). )
A law of Iissouri was held to bu unconstitutional which
provided that no Texan cattle should be brought into the State
between March 1st and November 1st, and when such cattle were
taken through the State during that part of the year by an
transportation company, if any disease should occur along the
line of such transportation, then the company should be lia-
ble for all damages. The legislabure in passing this statute
clearly transcended its power t.o legislate and invaded the
domain of Congress, for by the statute no greater restriction
could be placed upon commerce, as it entirely prohibited cat-
tle of all kinds, whether diseased or not, from being trans-
ported into the St.ate. If the legislature had enacted a law
which only prohibited diseased cattle from being brought with-
in the State during a certain period of the year or at all
times of the year, it could have been sustained under the
State's rigt to pasvs laws for the protection of tAe health
of it's citizens. In decidiri, this case, the court said :
'While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary
laws and laws for the protection of life, liberty, property
or health within its borders, while it may prevent persons
and animals suffering under contagious and infectious diseas-
es, or convicts, eta., from entering the State, and while for
the prpose of self protection it. may establish quarantine and
reasonable inspection laws, it may not, interfere with trans-
portation into or through the State beyond what is absolutely
necessary for self-protection. It. may not, under cover of
exerting its police power, substantially prohibit or burden
either ,ooreign or interstate commerce. The police power of a
gtate ca ,ot obstruct foreign comerce beyond the necessity
of its exercise and, under color of it, objects not. within its
scope cannot be secured at. the expense of the protection af-
forded by the Federal Constitution.' (i . .. Co. v. unen,
95 U. (1. 46.)
No ,tat.e, under the power it, has to protect the life,
health and safety of its citizens, has the ti!, o enact, a
law forbiddin, any common carrier from briin, any intoxica-
ting liquors into the Stat. without at _iist obtaining a cer-
tificate sealed with the se-. of the county autitor of the
cotuty where the liquors are to be taken ; for b' so doing,
the Stt8e Legislature at.tempts t.o exorcise a jurisdiction ov-
er persons and plroper-t-y without the 24. .+.. The t: .J,e by vii'-
tue of such. legislation seeks to pirohibi!, the iportation in-
to its ovwn limits of a just, article of .oov' orco, and therefore
the legisla.ion is designed as a regulation for the conduct
of c6iynerce before the real subject of comirnerce has been
brought within its borders. Such legislation is not a local
legislation, designed to aid and facilitate comnerce ; neith-
er is it, an inspection law, nor a law to regulate or restrict
the sale of articles deemed injurious to tie health and morals
of the comnunity, nor a regulation confined to purely inter-
nal co:.nnerce of a State, nor a restriction which only operates
upon propert.y, after it becones minglod with and forms part of
the mass of -.he property within the %tate ; but it is, on
the other hand, a regulation directly affecting interstate
comeice in an essential rnd vital point. (Bonn v. _
.Ca_. 125 U. S. 465.)
PART Ill.
Statement and Discussion of a fea, of thc Impor-
Cases that have arisen under the Comerce Clause, by
reason of the Taxing Power of a State.
Having briefly considered a fexi of t,. important cases
,hich have txisen umder the commerce clause of the Constitution
by reason of some restraint havirwg been laid on co:rnerce other
than a tax, 1 will now. state and briefly discusi a few of the
cases tb have arisen under the taxing power of a State.
One of the first cases that came before tbh Supreme Court
in which this power was involved was B'o'm v. LLa c (1i
'Wheaton, 419), and the court held that a statute of itaryland
which required importers of goods to take out a license and
pay a license fee thei'efor imposed a burden or condition upon
engaging in foreign commerce, whether the licerso fee was re-
garded as an imposition of a tax or a more regulation of the
business. The court also held that, a taxation of an impor-
ter, in the way of requiring a license for his engaing in the
business, was +,,e same t-hin.' as t tax on the business itself,
and tfhe-'eforo if, was cle-rly -a re ;A!t±io of commerce.
In the Stat.e Freight Tax cases (l'5 Wallace, 284), the
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question presented to the court to decide was whether a stat-
ute of a State imposing a tax upon freight taken up within
the State and carried out of it,-- or, in different words,
upon all freight other than that taken up and delivered in
the State,-- is repupiant to the commerce clause of the Cons-
titution. The court decided that it made no difference that
the effect of the statute was not to discriminate between the
citizens of one State and those of another or that, it only
applied to railroads within the Itate, for the reason that the
tax was not on the franchise or business of the corporation
but on the subject of co.merce itself, and therefore its ef-
feet being extra-territorial it was clearly a burden upon and
a regulation of cor,.erce. it ig perfectly clear that when
a State enacts such a law it exceeds its taxing power, for if
a State has any right to impose any tax at all upon a subject
of commerce being transported in or out of the State it has
the right, to impose sufficiently large a tax to destroy all
commerce and thereby defeat the very purpose for which the
power over comierce was given to the general Government. The
subject of transportation from one State to another, being one
of a National character, requires National regulation.
It is not within the power of a State to impose a tax
20
upon persri,; ,!oainil in poods no+, produlced in t,.ho tate, while
,.-o correapodii4 ,r tax is imposed unon tbose dealing in Luoods
which are the product of tle ltate, neither is it, within the
power of i State to impose a tax on r,!]ing goods to be ship-
ped into the S..ate, when no such tax is imposed upon selling
the corresponding home product, for tbo reason that comrerco
muist. remain free and itu!ram.ie1 ed and not, be loaded dovm with
any of +,he burdens of selfish ±.aelcgi,_slation. (R v.
A tax of a certain amount. on each car, iMposed by a Sate
on all . opin, cars or coaches run over a railroad of t1ho
gtate and not ovmed by the railroad company itself, is uncons-
titutional as an interference vrith interstate corn-erce. (PU-
2 v. Fjan. ,., 1! 7 U. I. ;1.k) But. t.he Supreme Court
has held that i. is perfectly legitimate for a State, inas-
much as 1t. i a +, o)o i . to t.ax personal property within its
jurisdiction even though such property is employed in inter-
+,ae coYmer'e 0o impose a tax on such proportion of the
whole capital stock of a foreign Sleeping cai company as the
number of mile- over which its c(..rs are operated within the
1,,l he bears to the whole nunber of miles over vibich it.s c-.rs
are oper,+,ed, though such cars run into, through and out, of
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t.he , ; ).nd ,h, ,ounds upon viiT such .i satut, is held
con i..itutional are M,,he lejislative poi:er, of every State
ext.en to .! 1 property w;ilbin its border', :- het3er engaged in
intorsaie mmere or not$ z-mn] ti,. inamuc ,.s s "b pioperty
cmn be _ffec+,ed by thc. laws of any other State only so farl as
the oomitoy of th t. State allows, it is porfect: ovi.i.mato_
for a qS.tfe to repeal , modify or limit such laws of coity,
,"id when it, does so .ct it simply exercises an ordinary and
propor fun!tion of legislation. O 1lmgn Palace -m, .__. v.
in , 11 Sup. Ct. 876.)
While if, has recen+,ly ba,,een held t1lt,., a statUte of a State
requiring tbe 5-len+ of a foreig. express company doing busi-
ness in !,!e Stt te to pay a license fee of five dolturs and do-
posit w,+ith the auditor a statement. of t.he company's assets and
liabIilities, showing thl.t, i, has an actual capital of a ,or-
-,ain ainont ;, , i invalid a. being a burden upon co.mmerce, upon
the rounds that tl,,)e prerogative and responsibilty for provi-
dir,' for tlne sec-)rity of the citizers and people of the United
States, irn relatio to foreifg'L corporate bodies or individuals
with whom they may have relations of interstate cormerce, belong
0o the Government of the United States and not 1...o .over-
ments of the several Sta,tes (Crli- v. Keni, ucky, 11 Stp.
Ct. 851), it has more recently been held by the same couit,--
and it secis, to me in direct opposition to the principle laid
down in the last case ,-- that a State has t.ho power to require
every corporation operating a railroad in its borders to pay
an "annual excise tax for the privilege of exorcising iOp
franchises', the amoumt of the tax to be doteninod accordin,
to a 71iding scale proportioned to the averag, e gross earnings
per mile 'within th, State for tho year preceding the levy of
the tax. The main ground upon hi is "decided
was that any State ha, a porfeut ripht to domanc of any cor-
poration a certain excise tax for the privilege of exercising
its franchises within tbe State. (S .Q Ijaine v. i
Trmk. iS.. L fo. . 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121.) This de-
cision of the court, like many others decided of late under
the taxing power of a State, is irreconcilable wit, h other de-
cisions of the cout, and therefore I have not attempted to
reconcile it by stretching my imagination to see or read cer-
tain things out of this opinion which the court never intended
to be so read.
PART I V.
9tatement of General Principlec established by
the Uni ed State Supreme Cour., and used by them in
determining vhet',olo' or not a State li.- exceoded its
Powers.
As a conclusion, it, may be st, ed that, oiintg to the un-
certaint, of the border line between the police and taxing
powers of a Stt.u and the powers of Congress as regards the
subject of connerce, and also owing to the recent revolution-
ary and uncertain decisions of the court upon these subjects,
no definite and specific rules can be laid down, as to when a
State can validly legislate upon tbor and as to when it can
not, but there are a fevi general principles which the cou't
always applies whenever it can, eanLd ymay be su rmed up as
follows :
1. The power to reguilate comorce among the States hav-
ing been _:iven to Coress by ibe United States Constitution,
that. power is exclusive whenever the subjects of it are Na-
tional in their character and admit of only one uniform sys-
tem or plan of regulation.
2. Whenever a subject is meroly of local concern a Stari-
may rightfully legislate upon it although such legislation
may remotelr affect connerce, and the legislation of the State
will be valid until superseded by Congressional legislation.
3. Whenever Congress fails to legislate upon subjects
of a National character its failure to so legislate indicates
its wil that the subject. shall be free from any regulations
by the respective natesv.
4. No State has a right, to lay a tax on interstate com-
merce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the trans-
portation of the subjects of that. commerce or on the receipts
derived from the transportation or on the occupation or busi-
ness of carrving it, on.
5. All States have the right to tax all personal prop-
erty within their jurisdiction, whether that, property is en-
gaged in interstate commerce or whether it has its siia in
the State, provided the tax is legally proportioned.
6. Any State has the power to require a certain excise
tax of any corporation for the privilege of exercising its
franchises in its borders.
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